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Abstract—Passwords should be easy to remember, yet ex-
piration policies mandate their frequent change. Caught in
the crossfire between these conflicting requirements, users
often adopt creative methods to perform slight variations
over time. While easily fooling the most basic checks for
similarity, these schemes lead to a substantial decrease in
actual security, because leaked passwords, albeit expired,
can be effectively exploited as seeds for crackers. This
work describes an approach based on Bloom filters to
detect password similarity, which can be used to discourage
password reuse habits. The proposed scheme intrinsically
obfuscates the stored passwords to protect them in case of
database leaks, and can be tuned to be resistant to common
cryptanalytic techniques, making it suitable for usage on
exposed systems.
Index Terms—password, Bloom filters, hash functions, text
analysis
1. Introduction
Text-based passwords are still the most common way
to authenticate users against services [14]. According
to a typical classification for authorization mechanisms,
they fall in the “what you know” category. The other
categories, “what you are” and “what you have”, are
most commonly used only as a second factor for the so-
called MFA multiple factor authentication schemes [13].
An example of MFA is a one time password available
only on a personal device (e.g. smartphone) at each login
attempt into a critical service. Passwords should be easy
to remember, but hard to guess. In a long game of cops
and robbers, users try to base them on dictionary words
[16], and system administrators write policies to block
these attempts. As a common reaction, users make simple
variations to hide the base, easy-to-remember common
word. This makes the password harder to remember, so
users try to stick to the same one forever, but system
administrators add expiration times to their policies. Users
then adapt by making the smallest possible change at each
password update. This is still an insecure behavior, making
life much easier to malicious actors trying to guess current
passwords, because old ones are often available through
leaked databases. The countermeasure to discourage this
behaviour is to prevent choosing a password too similar
to the previous one(s). The problem with the simplest
approaches to similarity estimation — for example based
on the Levenshtein distance [9] between two clear-text
strings — is that passwords are sensitive and personal
data. Storing them to enable similarity checks exposes
users to unacceptable risks of breaches that may result
in unauthorized access to some of their accounts. To
overcome this problem, in this paper we propose a system
to calculate the similarity of passwords over obfuscated
data, based on Bloom filters. The tuning of the filter is
thoroughly analyzed to determine the values of param-
eters that ensure password secrecy, yet allow achieving
an effective detection of similarity. The scheme natively
allows the integration of a cryptographic access control
method, which will be investigated in a future work.
The paper is structured in the following way: section
2 discusses a list of previous works and state-of-the-art
tools that employ similar techniques to evaluate similarity
between data. The details of password similarity, design
of our system and a possible attack on this kind of
data analyzers are introduced in section 3. Our scheme
was implemented in C language for the Linux operating
system, and a performance analysis is presented in section
4. We illustrate some application scenarios and propose
future improvements for our work in section 5.
2. State of the art
The foundations for this work can be traced back to
Schnell’s (et alii) paper [15], which describes a method
for querying private data over a Bloom filter structure.
Another work presented in [1] describes the application of
privacy methods like differential privacy to probabilistic
data structures such as Bloom filters. While the described
approach is vulnerable to an attack called the “Profile
Reconstruction Attack”, this is due to use of differential
privacy methods (which are not exploited in our work) and
not to the filter itself. Anonymized datasets, using tech-
niques such as differential privacy, purposely introduces
errors and noise in the data in order to hide the presence
of specific information or to ensure that links between
users and his correspondant data cannot be established.
This controlled errors are compensated in large dataset:
the errors do not effect the quality of such evaluations. In
our use cases, users - even if forced to change password
regularly - can’t generate a password dataset big enough to
compensate the introduced noise. That is, anonimization
techniques can affect the quality of password similarity
queries, with several false positives compared to the pro-
posed bloom filter approach. We still did not provide an
experimental analysis of this statement which is planned
to be implemented in future works. RAPPOR [6] is a
system used by Google to get data from the Chrome
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browser. The data is hashed in a Bloom filter, anonymized
by introducing a perturbation on the values, and then
retrieved and reconstructed at server side. This approach is
similar to the one we propose in this work, but it explicitly
does not apply to passwords, to avoid sending potentially
sensitive data from the device to a cloud system. To the
best of our knowledge, in the literature there is not a use
case for a password scenario. For this reason the aim of
this paper is to study it, illustrate the advantages it brings,
and discuss the security-related issues that it introduces.
3. Password similarity
It is widely known that password reuse is a common
behaviour which can turn into a threat if passwords get
leaked online [8]. Password leaks are a common form of
information leak that happens regularly1. A similar threat
appears when a user is forced to a password change and
(especially for corporate passwords that must be changed
quite often), he can insert a different password with little
variations from the last one (e.g. password2020 changing
password from password2019). This can make brute
force attacks very effective, since the new password is
easily computed by a limited number of mutations starting
from a dictionary of leaked ones. We can describe the
password mutation as a perturbation of the password with
slight variants. Tools such as password crackers or word-
lists generators like cupp2 or johntheripper3 implements
various methods for password generation, the passwords
can also be generated by neural-based techniques such
as adversarial generation [10]. With these approaches,
choosing a similar password is almost as insecure as
choosing a dictionary password [17]. For the purpose of
this work, password similarity can be informally defined
as the structural similarity of the text composing two
password being compared, i.e. it has nothing to do with the
possible underlying meaning of the string. This definition
of password similarity can be used to guarantee that a user
is not reciclying what, in terms of actual entropy, can
be considered the same password every time. Common
methods to guide users to choose “robust” passwords are
focused on avoiding the direct use of dictionary words.
These methods have two shortcomings: users resource
to variations that are easily discovered by mutation by
the aforementioned tools, and there is no detection of
password similarity when a password change is mandated.
A straightforward method to detect password similarity
over a meaningful time span would require saving old
passwords in clear-text into a database, which is obviously
a despicable approach. We propose a solution based on
Bloom filters that overcomes this shortcoming.
3.1. Bloom filters for text similarity
A Bloom filter is a probabilistic data structure which
can be used to cache data and speed up operations such
as lookup in databases [2], [11]. It is composed by:
1. https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-emerging-threats-2019-data-
breaches.html
2. A password generator based on personal and open source data:
https://github.com/Mebus/cupp
3. Johtheripper is a common password cracker and generator https:
//www.openwall.com/john/
• a bucket which can be an array of bits initially set
to the false value (0);
• a set of hash functions which will be used to insert
and check values.
An insertion operation (Insert(β, s)) of a value in a
Bloom filter is performed according to the following steps:
• the value that must be inserted into the bucket is
hashed using the set of hash functions; The hash
functions output must be re-mapped to provide
indexes in the co-domain of cardinality κ.
• every bucket slot indexed by the keys got using
the hash functions is set to the true value (1).
This operation therefore insert the hashed value into the
filter, setting the correspondent hash values to the true
value. This is described in figure 1 which pictures an
insertion of the strings password1234 and password123!.
The verification process of the value presence in the filter
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
password1234
password123!
Figure 1. Insertion procedure with two strings. The strings
password1234 and password123! are hashed independently. This
Insertion procedure process the passwords as single items, leading to
different hashed values.
(Check(β, s) → Boolean) is analogous to the insertion
case:
• The element which is checked is hashed against
all the functions to get a list of indexes;
• If any index points to a false value, then the
element is not present in the filter for sure. The
Bloom filter never exhibits false negatives.
• Otherwise the value can be present in the filter,
but due to the collision possibility of the hash
functions, the result can be a false positive.
This procedure is described in figure 2. Bloom filters can
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
password1234 → Maybe present
helloworld → Not Present
Figure 2. Check procedure with two strings. The strings password1234
and helloworld are hashed independently and the resultant indexes from
the hashe functions are checked in the bucket. If the lookup lead to a 0
value, the string is not present in the filter. Otherwise, it can be a value
that is present in the filter or can be a collision (a false positive).
be used for text similarity using an n-gram approach. This
techniques divides the string in n-grams and hashes every
resultant n-gram with the hash functions present in the set:
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
pa ss wo rd 12 34
password1234
pa ss wo rd 12 3!
password123!
Figure 3. n-gram insertion procedure with two strings. The strings are
divided into n − grams (in this case bi-grams) and hashed using an
Insert operation for every n− gram.
The hashing procedure to enable the measure of distance
is presented in figure 3. By extending the check procedure
to get the number of n-grams which are the same in the
two strings, independently of the order, the similarity of
the two sets can be calculated by using various distance
definitions. The similarity distance of two Bloom filters
is commonly expressed using the Jaccard coefficient [3]
and is defined as:
δ(β1, β2) =
2γβ1,β2
kβ1 + kβ2
(1)
With γβ1,β2 as the common number of true values in the
sets of the two Bloom filters β1 and β2. kβ1 and kβ2 are
the number of true values of, respectively, the β1 filter
and β2 filter. Therefore the relevant operations on a filter
to measure similarity are:
• Create(Γ, κ)→ β which generate a Bloom filter
β using the hash functions present in the set Γ
with a bucket of size κ.
• Insert(β, s) which insert the value s in the Bloom
filter.
• Check(β, s)→ Boolean which check if the value
s is not present in the filter or if it collides with a
present value.
• QInsert(β, s, ν) that insert the string s splitting
it in ν-grams.
• Distance(β1, β2) → Real that returns the dis-
tance between two Bloom filters. To be compara-
ble, two Bloom filters must have the same bucket
size κ, and need to use the same set of hash
functions Γ.
The effectiveness of the filter is strictly tied to the
choice of the hash function set Γ and the size of the bucket
κ. The tuning of these parameters is essential to achieve a
satisfactory trade-off between the utility of the query and
the number of false positives. A wrong sizing of buckets
or a choice of low-randomness hash functions can easily
lead to a vulnerable filter (as detailed in section 3.4) or to
an unstable filter that leads to too many false positives.
3.2. Privacy guarantees
To size the filter there are some criteria which can be
derived from the following formulas:
fpp =
(
1−
(
1− 1
m
)kn)k
(2)
Where fpp is the false positive probability of the filter.
This can be calculated a-priori from the variables m, k
and n, defined as:
• m, the cardinality of the set on which the filter is
built;
• k, the number of different hash functions that are
used to hash values into the filter;
• n, the number of elements which will be inserted
into the filter.
From this formula we can derive the optimal values for
the filter size and the number of hash functions to use for
a specific number of elements that will be inserted in the
filter. The optimal value for m can be calculated as:
m′ =
⌈
−n ln fpp
(ln2)2
⌉
(3)
The optimal number of different hash functions is derived
from the optimal size of the Bloom filter internal set:
k′ =
⌈
m′
n
ln 2
⌉
(4)
with m′ being the optimal value for m calculated as in
3. The rationale behind this sizing formula comes from
the observation that as the size of buckets increases, the
probability of collisions decreases. Using this approach, a
Bloom filter with a controllable number of false positives
can be tuned to fit any specific scenario. Conversely,
as it is useful for the proposed application in order to
enhance password confidentiality, a Bloom filter can be
designed in such a way to have a big number of false
positives, thus obfuscating data by forcing collisions. Pass-
word confidentiality could be protected also by adopting
privacy-preserving approaches, such as δ-presence [12] or
differential privacy [5], exist. These approaches take in
consideration the amount of data stored into a database,
or the filter in this case, and try to anonymize the data
between many false positives. In this case the approach
is directly applicable to the filter which can gain a lot of
advantages in terms of privacy from this approach.
3.3. Analysis of the hash function family
Another key component of the filter which impacts on
confidentiality is the distribution of the values returned by
the chosen hash function family. In this kind of probabilis-
tic data structures, it may be necessary to deploy a huge
number of hash functions. Using a different algorithm for
every index can be unfeasible, and in any case a large
variability within the hash function set hinders a precise
analysis of the randomness of the generator. To overcome
these problems, the hash function set can be generated
by using the well-known salt approach, as described in
figure 4. When a value has to be inserted, many random
numbers (salts) are generated. Prepending these numbers
to the value, and using a fixed hash function, the effect is
analogue to having adopted different, random hash func-
tions. In our implementation we used MD5 as the base
hash function. The salts are saved in the same location as
the filter set, to allow reloading the state in subsequent
invocations of the algorithm. We acknowledge that this
trivial solution is vulnerable to attacks if the file is saved
in clear-text form, like the one described in section 3.4.
Saving salts in a more secure way seems not too
challenging, and is the subject of current and future
investigation aimed at making the filter immune to this
kind of attacks. For example, the salt can be generated
using a cipher like AES using an user provided key and
a fixed payload similarly to AES-CTR mode, extending
the functions applicable on the filter with a function
GenerateHashes(key) → Γ which generate the set of
hash functions Γ starting from the key key. Using this
technique, the filter set can be saved without specific
protections, since it can be verified only using the chosen
secret key. An in-depth analysis of the security of the
encryption scheme, particularly concerning the peculiarity
of having very short payloads due to the division in
n-grams, will be the focus of ongoing research work.
These approaches to the generation of hash functions
are described in figure 4. In the first hash set we can
see that h1 and h2 are two functions generated with a
random padding applied to the MD5 hash function. In this
scenario we suppose to have a Random(n) function that
can generate a random string of length n. This generation,
when re-applied will lead to a totally different set of hash
functions, making the distance function inapplicable. That
is the concept of the construction of h1′ and h2′. These
functions can return different results from the functions
h1 and h2 described before. Reusing the same value for
the salt applied to the functions will lead to the same set
of results, making the distance calculation possible. This
is the concept of the third figure, which describes how,
applying a fixed salt to a symmetric cipher using a secret
key k the filter will lead to the same set of results.
3.4. Anagram attack
The system as described in the previous sections is
vulnerable to an attack which exploits the order of the
discovered n-grams. This attack aims to reconstruct the
password as the anagram of the various n-grams. The
attack is composed of four steps:
1) Generate all the hashes for a specific n-gram;
2) Hash the n-grams into a Bloom filter;
3) Analyze the Bloom filter and get the position of
bits set to the true value;
4) Compose the various n-grams to create a pass-
word.
This scenario can be disruptive and can lead to the full
disclosure of hashed password in no time. Also, this
kind of attack can be enhanced with the help of a word
dictionary similar to the one used in classical password
attacks: the search tree can be pruned by excluding the
words which do not contain the n-gram. For instance, let
us imagine that a user inserts the password “password!!”
in the filter with ν = 2. Accordingly, the attacker will
h1(s) = MD5(Random(10) + s)
h2(s) = MD5(Random(10) + s)
Insert(β,′ password1234′)→ {6, 15}
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
h1′(s) = MD5(Random(10) + s)
h2′(s) = MD5(Random(10) + s)
Insert(β′, password1234)→ {9, 14}
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
h1′′(s) = MD5(fixedsalt1 + s)
h2′′(s) = MD5(fixedsalt2 + s)
Insert(β′′, password1234)→ {3, 11}
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ĥ1(s) = MD5(AES(k, fixedsalt1), s)
ĥ2(s) = MD5(AES(k, fixedsalt2), s)
Insert(β̂, password1234)→ {5, 9}
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Figure 4. Different hash functions generation. These functions will lead
to different use-cases. In the first two figures we have a fully random
generation which leads to different cases every time as we cannot
predict the output got from Random function. The fourth case employes
a cryptographic function and a set of fixed strings (fixedsaltn) to
generate the same set of hash function based on a secret key k.
generate all the possible bi-grams. This, using an alphabet
∆ will result in a generation of |∆|2 bi-grams which,
for the ASCII case, is (127 − 32)2 = 9025 bi-grams, an
operation which requires at most a couple of milliseconds
on any modern CPU. After this step, the attacker will
hash the bi-grams inserting them into the filter, which
requires Θ(n) insertions with n as the number of bi-grams.
Subsequently, the attacker can create all the possible
combinations in the search space generated by the pruned
alphabet of bi-grams ∆II . The research can be conducted
by using an incremental number of repetitions. Therefore,
the number of combinations which can be generated using
the corresponding Bloom filter are:(
∆ν
n
ν
)
(5)
with n as the length of the searched string and ν the grade
of the n-grams. In the case of a common password of 8
ASCII characters and a Bloom filter constructed with bi-
grams the formula will result to:(
9025
8
2
)
≈ 2.76× 1014 (6)
combinations. If we consider the worst case with repeti-
tions the formula become(∆ν + n
ν
− 1
n
ν
)
(7)
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Figure 5. Creation time of the filter changing the size of the salt strings.
which, in this example, will result to
(
9025+4−1
4
)
which is
almost the same as the non-repetition case. Passwords can
be longer than 8 char to provide enough security against
brute-force or dictionary attacks. For a password varying
from n characters to N the number of combinations are:
N∑
i=n
(∆ν + i
ν
− 1
i
ν
)
(8)
In our data-set the average password size was 11.56, there-
fore, limits between 8 and 14 can be evaluated resulting
in:
14∑
i=8
(9025 + i
2
− 1
i
2
)
≈ 9.96× 1023 (9)
The crypto-analysis of the attack should include the details
of the filter like the size of the bucket or the number of
hash functions used.
4. Experimental analysis
The specified method to check password similarity
has been implemented in C language. The hash functions
used was the standard OpenSSL4 implementations of hash
functions, in this case MD5. The system was checked on
a Ubuntu 18.04 system running in a VirtualBox virtual
machine with 2 virtual CPUs and 1 GB of memory. The
hypervisor runs over an Intel core i7-8700 cpu which
clock frequency runs at 3.2GHz, and the host is used
exclusively to run the test VM. The random data was
provided by /dev/urandom to avoid blocking behaviour
[7] and read to generate random hash functions. We used
the following queries used to check the filter:
1) β ← Create(Γ, κ)
2) Insert(β,AAAA)
3) Insert(β,BBBB)
4) Check(β,AAAA)
5) Check(β,CCCC)
6) Check(β,BBBB)
In this case the hash dimension seems not to influence
the performances of the filter. The computational load
4. https://www.openssl.org/
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Figure 6. Performances of the filter compared to the edit distance applied
to the password data set
is dominated by the generation of the salt string. The
performance of the salt string generation presented in
figure 5 are the averaged results of 5 runs of experiments,
in which the size of the salt changes from 1 (really easy
to brute-force) to 1000 (really hard to brute-force). As
shown in the graph, the performance decreases linearly
when the salt size increases. This happens because a
single random character of the salt must be multiplied
by the number of hash functions present in the filter. The
QInsert and Distance performances has been evaluated
using the following querying pattern:
1) β1 ← Create(Γ, κ)
2) QInsert(β1, thisismypassword, 2)
3) β2 ← Create(Γ, κ)
4) QInsert(β2, thisismyp4ssword, 2)
5) β3 ← Create(Γ, κ)
6) QInsert(β3, thisismypassw0rd, 2)
7) Distance(β1, β2)
8) Distance(β1, β3)
In this test run, as in the Insert evaluation, the compu-
tational load is dominated by the filter generation. This
system was also tested using c.a. 5000 credentials from
real-world leaked institutional logins. Data were clustered
and analyzed using the filter, to observe which values
are correctly identified as similar. The graph in figure 6
represent the analysis of the filter’s precision. The graph
also shows the edit distance between the various strings.
5. Application scenarios
In this work, we described a technique to analyze
password similarity maintaining a good trade-off between
utility and privacy. The proposed use case presents a
system that can notify if a new password is not different
enough from a previous one. The typical application could
be a browser’s plug-in that issues a warning when the
distance between a new password chosen by the user
and the strings saved in the plug-in is below a pre-
declared threshold. The application can be exploited both
to discourage the use of similar passwords over time and
to prevent their use over different domains as pictured in
figure 7. The application can be instrumented to report the
results of equations in section 3 regarding not only the
similarity check result, but also the various parameters
Service 1
P4ssword123!
Service 2
P4ssw0rd123!
Browser

β
Figure 7. Application scenario: The browser can insert the passwords
P4ssword123! and P4ssw0rd123! into the Bloom filter, checking if
they are similar enough to trow a warning of password similarity.
characterizing the filter, to evaluate the quality of the
classification process.
5.1. Future works
We are actually working on several improvements of
the proposed password similarity algorithm:
• As stated in the section 3, the filter can be gen-
erated using encrypted salts in conjunction with
a strong cryptographic hash function5. This ap-
proach can be employed to ensure that data in-
serted in the structure are analyzable only by the
owner of the secret key. The crypto-analysis of
the resultant system should be explored to create
secure Bloom filters.
• A comparison with deep-learning based tech-
niques can be introduced. This comparison should
therefore include an analysis of the resistance
against data-set reverse engineering. We argue that
a neural network-based system needs a bigger
data-set than our Bloom filter-based one, and that
the former approach can be difficult to analyze
using black-box classifiers.
• The analysis of the crypto-system can be improved
with a more in-depth comparison with privacy
preserving techniques, such as δ-presence or dif-
ferential privacy. As stated in section 5, these ap-
proaches can suffer from the same issues affecting
the deep-learning based one, i.e., the user cannot
provide a data-set big enough to make the analysis
valuable.
• Analysis of homomorphic encryption could lead
to devise an encryption scheme to compute dis-
tances between encrypted strings using algorithms
present in literature [4].
We claim that these analyses can lead to the creation of an
useful password checker, which, while respecting user ex-
perience guidelines and security best-practices, can signal
to them dangerous similarities between their passwords.
5. For example SHA3.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a system which can help the
analysis of similar passwords keeping them obfuscated or
saved in a secure enclosure. This proposal tries to advise
against the behaviour of password reuse, acting from an
application point of view, using a controllable method
which is otherwise difficult to achieve. The system we
proposed uses Bloom filters, a family of probabilistic data
structures, as the core elements of its design. This choice is
driven by two properties of these artifacts: the predictabil-
ity of their behavior, and the deterministic cryptanalysis
that can be executed over them. In conclusion, we claim
that the proposed method can be integrated as a modu-
lar component in any kind of authentication system, to
discourage the use of vulnerable passwords.
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